

17 FEB 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Inspector General's Inspection
of the Office of Security

1. This memorandum contains recommendations submitted for Director of Central Intelligence approval. The two recommendations are contained in paragraph 9.

2. Our report of the inspection of the Office of Security is attached. For your convenience the major findings and conclusions are summarized herewith.

3. Organization and Management

a. To begin with we commend the Director of Security for the high quality of his personal leadership. In the very difficult task of directing the Agency's security program Col. Edwards has the complete support and loyal devotion of his people. In the Office of Security there is high morale among the employees and dedication to the Agency's service.

b. During the six years since our last inspection, the Office of Security has grown from an authorized strength of [REDACTED] to a current strength of [REDACTED]. The increase is about evenly divided between headquarters and the domestic field installations and is attributed in large part to increased demands on the Office of Security for support services.

25X1A

25X1A

~~SECRET~~

c. The organizational structure has been modified somewhat since 1954 into three major areas consisting of the Office of the Director of Security, with six supporting staffs, and two operational areas each under command of a Deputy Director. One operational area is concerned with personnel and physical security and is regarded as the overt service. The other is concerned with investigations and operational support of a covert nature. The separation of responsibilities on the basis of overt and covert is unrealistic and creates undesirable overlap and duplication of functions between the two areas and generates paper work unnecessarily. While we do not find the Office of Security overstaffed within the present structure, we believe some manpower economies can be obtained from a further modification along purely functional lines.

d. In the normal course of business the Office of Security acquires tremendous quantities of information, and processing, storage and retrieval present problems of major proportions. Better methods of records management must be developed to cope with the ever increasing mass of data. The possible application of advanced machine techniques should be studied. We also have recommended that time-consuming and cumbersome internal procedures, reporting requirements and administrative methods be examined in detail so that more efficient practices may be introduced. These too should result in a reduction of workload and a possible savings in manpower.

4. Personnel Security

a. Emphasis in our inspection was placed on a careful evaluation of the personnel security clearance process. In the main we found it to be effective. Field and headquarters investigations are made with painstaking thoroughness. Information thus acquired is appraised and reviewed by competent security officers and in cases in which favorable and unfavorable factors must be weighed a succession of reviews is made to guard against bias, prejudice and faulty judgment. Disapprovals are reviewed and passed upon by the Director of Security personally.


b. The critical point in the clearance process is the appraisal function. It is here that judgment is exercised in determining the degree of security risk present in the history of the individual under consideration. This judgment is based primarily on long experience supplemented by rather minimal criteria drawn from Executive Order 10450 and other similar documents. The fact that the Agency has not suffered a major security failure among its many employees is evidence of the soundness of the appraisers' judgment. Nevertheless we believe it is desirable to develop more firmly established criteria which take [REDACTED] factors into consideration. The Medical Staff is doing some research in this field and we have recommended that with the collaboration of the Director of Security the program be expanded to include specific security interests.

25X1A

Approved For Release 2000/04/11 : CIA-RDP62-01094R000500060027-9
25X1A

Approved For Release 2000/04/11 : CIA-RDP62-01094R000500060027-9

25X1A



5. Employee Activities

a. The Office of Security provides a very valuable advice and guidance service to all employees seeking assistance in matters of security significance. Some of these are required by regulation,

25X1A



foreign countries. Frequently employees bring in their problems or

questions voluntarily and this practice is encouraged. By this means the Office of Security keeps in touch with the nature of employee problems and can help to prevent security violations and indiscretions.

b. Larger problems in which employees may become involved also are handled efficiently. Accidents, sudden illness, emergencies of all sorts usually will bring the Office of Security into prompt action. Security officers in general and particularly the Night Security Officers are effective in their performance in meeting emergency situations.

c. The handling of employee cases of major importance presents certain problems with which we have attempted to deal in the report. Cases of disloyalty, criminal acts, major security or suitability failures require for their ultimate resolution the services of several Agency components. Most commonly involved are

25X1A

Officer also will be engaged. All of these are in addition to the individual's parent component and the appropriate command echelons. Obviously a great deal of close coordination is required.

d. One of the problems stems from the need for better communication between components. Cases must be handled expeditiously and the prompt notification of all interested parties is essential so that they can take the action required or be prepared to do so

at the appropriate time. When prompt notification is not forthcoming cases are dragged out interminably to the detriment of the Agency as well as the individual. Responsibility for notification has not been assigned specifically to any single authority but is left to the initiative of individuals in the various components. The Director of Security is among the first to be informed when situations arise and we have recommended that he assume full responsibility for the prompt notification of all other components.

e. Another problem is presented by the apparent unwillingness on the part of some senior officers to apply strong measures of discipline to employees whose conduct and behavior have involved them in major incidents. [REDACTED]

25X1A

[REDACTED] the DCI must investigate violations of the law committed by Agency employees and recommend appropriate punitive action within the bounds of operational security. This arrangement can be jeopardized by well-meaning but ill-considered leniency in the investigation and disposition of such cases. The DCI's policy of dealing severely with offending employees is well established but its application is not uniform throughout the Agency.

25X1A

f. Similarly we find a slackness of discipline among many officers at all levels which if not checked will dangerously lower the standards of morality and integrity of all employees. Many of the controlling devices found in regular Federal agencies are not imposed on CIA. This Agency relies heavily on the personal honesty and integrity of every employee and therefore must demand

that the highest standards be met and maintained. A general tightening of discipline is required and we have recommended as a first step that there be prepared and published a personal code setting forth what the Agency expects from its people. Thereafter it will be the responsibility of every supervisor to enforce discipline through the application of the code.

6. Physical Security

a. The difficult task of controlling access to the Agency's scattered premises and safeguarding the mass of classified and sensitive material is handled quite effectively. A growing problem is concerned with the increasing number and kinds of

25X1A



25X1A

7. Security Personnel


a. Throughout our examination of the Office of Security both in headquarters and the domestic field we have, with few exceptions, been very favorably impressed with the calibre of its employees at all levels and particularly with the professional security officers. Qualifications for selection are high, the training program is excellent and standards of performance are well above average. As a career, security work has definite limitations both in terms of opportunity for advancement and as preparation for broader fields of intelligence work. Very few Security careerists transfer on a permanent basis to other career services.

b. The problem of limited advancement is particularly acute in the Special Agent categories. These are the backbone of the investigative force most of whom are stationed in the domestic

25X1A



assuming some supervisory responsibilities. The nature of the work and the need to attract and hold competent, well-qualified people warrants more adequate compensation and we have recommended that additional GS-13 positions be authorized for senior level Special Agents.

c. Another category deserving of consideration for higher grades is the Night Security Officer in headquarters. This is a permanent force of security officers who provide security coverage after the normal work day is completed. They perform a number of routine functions such as area security inspections and GSA guard checks. They monitor  to any emergencies that may occur. They receive all calls on the Agency's emergency security extension and take action appropriate

25X1A

25X1A



initiative, judgment and competence and we believe the grades of Night Security Officers should be raised to compensate for their professional performance.

8. In summary, we believe the Agency's security program is well conceived to support the DCI's responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods; well balanced in terms of cost and

~~SECRET~~

manpower relative to the Agency's needs; and is directed and conducted energetically and effectively. The recommendations we have made are aimed at the development of better instruments for screening potentially unacceptable security risks, greater efficiency in management and generally tighter security discipline among the Agency's employees.


9. Two of the recommendations contained in the report are addressed to the DCI for consideration and approval. They are:

a. That the DCI reemphasize to senior officers his policy of dealing severely with Agency employees committing major offenses including neglect of duty, criminal acts or violations of security, and that maximum punitive action will be taken in all such cases.

b. That the DCI approve the preparation and publication of an Agency code as policy guidance for the development of higher standards of ethics, morality and integrity in the Agency.

With the DCI's approval, action to implement the above two recommendations will be initiated by the Inspector General.

25X1A


Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

cc: DDCI
DD/S

Approved:

DCI

DDCI copy - destroyed 10 April 1961
IG copy - destroyed 31 July 1961

SENDER WILL CHECK		CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM	
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL SECRET	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	Inspector General	<i>[Signature]</i>	
2	<i>Jan - File</i> - pls leave this attached to memo.		
3	IG	s/LBK	18 July
4			
5			
6			
	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Kirk:

Pursuant to the discussion at the Deputies' Meeting on 20 February, the Director (1) approved the recommendation referred to in paragraph 9a of the attached memorandum and asked that it be handled by discussion at the next Senior Staff Meeting, and (2) commented that he would consider the publication of an Agency code as indicated in 9b. It was my understanding that you would prepare such a paper.

[Signature] (over)

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
EO/DCI/JSEarman:blp x-8823	20 Feb 61

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2000/04/11 : CIA-RDP62-01094R000500060027-9

not

Do/know what happened to the carbon
copies, but Chris does not have in stayback file.

r.m.

Approved For Release 2000/04/11 : CIA-RDP62-01094R000500060027-9